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HAIL MARRIAGE AND FAREWELL
Ethan J. Leib*
It was elating to see the long-awaited victory for same-sex marriage pop
up on my screen at 10:01 a.m. on June 26, 2015. It felt like a victory for
rights, for open-mindedness, for love, and for the future. It was gratifying
to see something I wasn’t sure I would get to see in my lifetime. I felt for a
moment that I was living in a modern liberal state, where the state doesn’t
get in the business of making moral judgments about people’s intimate
choices in how they choose to organize their romantic and sexual lives.
But it didn’t take long reading the opinion to see something many in the
LGBT community warned people about along the way to marriage equality:
that the price of admission to marriage for same-sex couples was the further
reinforcement of a very traditional understanding of marriage and its role in
society.1 Justice Kennedy’s decision for the majority in Obergefell v.
Hodges2 is nothing if not a paean to a very traditional picture of marriage
and its centrality in the social order.3 That may have been the cost of his
vote: to get a conservative to sign onto same-sex marriage, perhaps we
needed a conservative vision of romantic and sexual life in marriage. And
maybe it was worth it, too; indeed, the two unmarried and one widowed
women on the Court signed onto the opinion with nary a concurring or
cautionary note. Costs aside, if we are going to have marriage at all, we
can’t have marriage that excludes same-sex couples.
Still, there is an important question that likely remains open after
Obergefell. Although no one can doubt that same-sex couples now have a
fundamental right to marry if and when the state offers marriage at all, one
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Mary Anne Case, Clare
Huntington, Joseph Landau, Juliet Lapidos, Evan Lee, Tom Lee, Michael Serota, Jed
Shugerman, Steve Thel, Ben Zipursky, Catherine Powell, and participants in a summer
Supreme Court workshop at Fordham University School of Law for conversations about this
piece. I first explored the ideas presented here in an op-ed, Ethan J. Leib, Opinion, Down
with Marriage, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2015, at A23, and have sought to make a similar
argument here in a longer format. Thank you to Lea Yoon for help with research and
substance. Thank you to Sarah Jaramillo for help with sources.
1. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. See id. at 2593–94 (“From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of
human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. . . . Rising from the most
basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”); id.
at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people
become something greater than once they were.”).
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might wonder whether Justice Kennedy actually created not just a right to
marry, but also a right to marriage itself.4 To wit, is it an outgrowth of the
Court’s opinion that there is a constitutional requirement that states provide
marriage and issue licenses? May states look for ways to pull themselves
away from endorsing marriage at all?
My conclusion in what follows is that, notwithstanding much rhetoric in
the opinion, states have some room to rethink marriage in light of marriage
equality. And with some intellectual jujitsu, this opening to rethink the
state’s place in relational ordering gives marriage-skeptics another bite at
the apple to get something they wanted all along: to decenter the largely
religious, gendered, and bourgeois institution of marriage.5 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion has the unfortunate result of reaffirming marriage at the
top of a relational hierarchy, yet there are surely other ways we can have
civil rights and equality for gay people without marriage at all. A little bit
of resistance by several states might allow for movement toward an even
more progressive vision of a life in love. That vision either proliferates the
menu of options available to people—gay or straight—or makes a
meaningful effort to secularize the primary modality of recognizing and
legitimating the private choices people make about ordering their romantic
and sexual lives. Ultimately, this kind of disestablishment is not some
newfangled idea: the state actually was quite a latecomer into the marriage
business and it is only contingently in its current role.6
*

*

*

Justice Kennedy certainly skates very close to establishing a right to
marriage, not merely a right of access for same-sex couples to marry where
and when marriage exists. Indeed, he had a lot to work with, using the
Court’s own precedent. A recent count by the American Foundation for
Equal Rights—the organization that fought California’s Proposition 8 in the
courts, leading to the 2013 Hollingsworth v. Perry7 decision8—found at

4. Some commentators saw that the slippage between the right to marry and the right to
marriage long before Obergefell provided reason to revisit the question. See, e.g., Martha C.
Nussbaum, A Right to Marry, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 685–89 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096–97 (2005).
5. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE
FOR THEIR DIVORCE 1–18 (2010); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 32–33 (2008); Katherine M. Franke,
Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) (“[E]fforts to secure marriage
equality for same-sex couples must be undertaken, at a minimum, in a way that is compatible
with efforts to dislodge marriage from its normatively superior status as compared with other
forms of human attachment, commitment, and desire. Resisting the normative and epistemic
frame that values nonmarital forms of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage,
we must unseat marriage as the measure of all things.”).
6. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1766 (2005)
(citing GEORGE ELLIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904)); id. at
1794–95 (contrasting Puritan New England’s late entry into marriage licensure to the long
Anglo-American history of conflation “between religious and civil marriage”).
7. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

2015]

HAIL MARRIAGE AND FAREWELL

43

least fourteen Supreme Court cases since 1888 that advert to or support the
general idea of marriage as a fundamental right.9 Those cases provided
building blocks for the portion of the Obergefell decision that relies on the
Due Process Clause to reinforce why states may not ban same-sex
marriage.10 Although a Court decision based solely on the Equal Protection
Clause was possible, the decision Justice Kennedy actually wrote was a
mixture of equality-talk rooted in equal protection jurisprudence and
fundamental rights-talk rooted in the Due Process Clause.11 Still, as I read
it, the Court ultimately comes shy of establishing that states have a
constitutional obligation to provide some package of relational privileges
and burdens called marriage, which is another way to understand what it
would really mean for each individual to have a fundamental right to
marriage.
Consider this hypothetical. Imagine the federal government and all of
the states decide all at once on a creative solution to the culture war
surrounding same-sex marriage that is likely to continue for a few months
or years after Obergefell. The détente is an agreement that marriage in
America will be left wholly to the private sphere and that only “civil
unions” will be made available to all couples—opposite- or same-sex.
Under this plan, civil unions would be the only domestic arrangement the
state would recognize to disburse benefits to families, to exact taxes upon
families, and to administer its family law.
True enough, this “solution” doesn’t wholly dignify the claims of single
people who think the state should not be setting up systems to encourage
coupling with the effect of denigrating the perfectly dignified lives of those
who live as singles,12 nor does it address those who might seek legal
recognition for polyamorous unions.13 But it disestablishes marriage in a
way that could be useful to both sides in the culture wars: those who want
8. Id. at 2668 (overturning the Proposition 8 ballot initiative banning same-sex
marriage in California).
9. 14 Supreme Court Cases: Marriage Is a Fundamental Right, AM. FOUND. FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS (July 19, 2012), http://www.afer.org/blog/14-supreme-court-cases-marriageis-a-fundamental-right/ (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–
40 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)) [http://perma.cc/3LWS-CJH2].
10. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
11. For some discussion of why it might have been better for the Court to stick with a
more pure equal protection analysis, see Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism:
Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015).
12. See BELLA DEPAULO, SINGLED OUT:
HOW SINGLES ARE STEREOTYPED,
STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER 2–5 (2006); Michael
Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-heartsclub.html?ref=opinion&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/NSX3-F67Z].
13. See generally RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (2015).
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to associate with a church that has some exclusive definition of marriage
can have their way (a church that will not marry gays or a synagogue that
will not marry Jews to non-Jews) and those who want the state to treat allcomers equally in their requests for state recognition of partnership could
have their way too. The “solution” also helps the state unload the millennia
of baggage associated with marriage. Many feminists are right to highlight
that marriage has been a source of women’s oppression; many secularists
are right to highlight marriage’s religious character and the way the state
unduly and unnecessarily entangles itself in religious practice by licensing
marriages; and many sensitive to the way marriage stratifies society are
right to emphasize that marriage is a bourgeois institution that is both out of
reach for many poor people and that reinforces a certain kind of consumer
capitalism that is distasteful.14 It is better for the state to opt out and
distribute benefits and taxes in a more neutral way in the public sphere.
Would this possible world offend the U.S. Constitution? Surely, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion provides an odd quotation here and there to support that
position.15 But it is exceedingly difficult to see how that could be true, and
not only for reasons Justice Thomas alludes to in his dissent: that most of
our constitutional rights are negative rather than positive rights.16 It is hard
to believe there is one bundle of privileges and burdens, itself given only
one name—marriage—that states must provide. Indeed, there is plenty of
diversity among states in what they actually do provide, and there is no
corpus of constitutional law indicating the constitutional metes and bounds
of what the marital minimum for states is. We know the state can’t set up
“separate but equal” institutions—giving same-sex couples civil unions and
opposite-sex couples the thing called marriage—but that doesn’t give us
any clarity on the question at hand. It is true that a cleaner equal protection
analysis in Obergefell would probably have done more to foreclose the
argument that states must provide marriage, so this remains a real question.
But the best answer seems to be that if all states decided all at once to get
rid of marriage tomorrow in favor of civil unions for all, there is no
constitutional injury that is likely to follow.17
*

*

*

But let’s move from the hypothetical world back to the almost-real
world. Imagine that this “civil union for all” solution is tried not
nationwide, but is started first in a state called Alahoma or Oklatucky.
14. See generally sources cited supra note 5.
15. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2599 (“Like choices concerning contraception, family
relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution,
decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.”).
16. Id. at 2635–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17. I follow Martha Nussbaum here: “Nowhere . . . has the Court held that a state must
offer the expressive benefits of marriage. There appears to be no constitutional barrier to a
decision of a state to get out of the expressive game altogether, going over to a regime of
civil unions . . . .” Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 688. Although she was writing before
Obergefell, Obergefell is not a game-changer here.
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Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky seems to be urging that his state get out of
the marriage business.18 And Alabama and Oklahoma each got bills
through one of their legislative houses in the run up to Obergefell that at
least started the process of reconsidering the state’s entanglement with
marriage.19 If just one or two states try this mode of détente, is there a
constitutional injury that could be contemplated by same-sex or oppositesex couples?
Although I have suggested that there is no general right to have marriage
recognition from “the state” if such recognition is offered to no one, if a
state like Alahoma embraces this détente not to quell the culture war but to
stoke it, perhaps the intent of such legislation is so clearly meant to
denigrate same-sex couples that some theory of constitutional injury is
plausible for such couples. However, that would be a strange way of
thinking about the constitutional law of marriage: a facially neutral policy
of disestablishment that has the same impact on all members of the polity
equally would be unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples because
of an invidious intent, but not as applied to opposite-sex couples, who
cannot claim that the policy was adopted to discriminate against them.
Even if it were possible for same-sex couples to challenge a state’s effort to
get out of the marriage business (leaving only same-sex couples with a
remedy of marriage, not opposite-sex couples), it would not be easy to
show that such a state is doing so for constitutionally suspect reasons.
There are many reasons why a state—even if acting alone—would
consider getting out of the marriage business. Some of those reasons are
not just “benign” in the sense that they are not driven by malice or
animus,20 but they are affirmatively rights-protecting. States may be
getting out of the marriage business (1) to promote religious associational
rights in the private sphere where some wish to maintain traditional forms
of marriage out of genuine religious beliefs; (2) to promote rights of gender
equality in light of marriage’s long history of reinforcing gender roles; or
(3) to promote a more contractarian and less religiously inflected coupling
institution for the secular state. Not only do none of these state purposes
seem invidious, they all have serious constitutional dimensions of their own
that could be seen in certain lights as vindicating underenforced
constitutional norms.
*

*

*

18. See Rand Paul, Government Should Get Out of the Marriage Business Altogether,
TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939374/rand-paul-gay-marriage-supreme-court/
[http://perma.cc/4URY-ASCC].
19. See S.B. 377, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/
SB377/2015 [http://perma.cc/CC3J-JN33]; H.R. 1125, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015),
https://legiscan.com/OK/text/HB1125/2015 [http://perma.cc/DAX3-3G3K]. Neither bill was
passed into law.
20. Of course, “animus” can undermine state laws even under rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause according to the logic of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
633–34 (1996), an earlier Justice Kennedy opinion vindicating the civil rights of gay people.
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Yet I confess the constitutional analysis here belies the atmospherics.
Moving from the almost-real world to the actual world, what we saw
happening in Oklahoma and Alabama right before Obergefell was not a
careful debate about marriage’s future in light of what the Supreme Court
was about to do. There was fear and anxiety about the integration of the
institution and a casting about for some way to resist what was about to
happen. Indeed, Oklahoma State Representative Republican Ted Russ, the
author of the Oklahoma bill, acknowledged he was responding to the
marriage equality movement and explained, “The point of my legislation is
to take the state out of the process and leave marriage in the hands of the
clergy.”21
Although the most rash of approaches to détente offered by Oklahoma
and Alabama did not come to pass, a plausible analogy could be made to
the Southern states that thought it better to get rid of public pools and public
schools altogether than to integrate them racially, as the federal government
was requiring. This “Massive Resistance” movement sought to stem the
tide of civil rights being granted to blacks.22 A similar movement seemed
to be bubbling up in some Southern states as the federal government was
about to create a right to same-sex marriage: better to have no marriage
than to sully the institution by integrating it. That analogy does not cast the
right-wing proposals for getting out of the marriage business in a very
favorable light, and history has judged Southern resistance to integration
during the Civil Rights Revolution harshly—and deservedly so. Should we
judge pockets of resistance to integrating marriage with same-sex couples
as harshly?
*

*

*

To be fair, neither Oklahoma nor Alabama passed their laws in
anticipation of the ruling, and in the few weeks after the ruling there has
been widespread compliance with the Court’s decision, even in states that
looked like they were interested in resistance.23 But it would be premature
21. See Randy Ellis, House Passes Bill to Abolish Oklahoma Marriage Licenses,
OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 10, 2015), http://newsok.com/house-passes-bill-to-abolish-oklahomamarriage-licenses/article/5400240 [http://perma.cc/SXA2-LTZY].
22. For historical background on Massive Resistance, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE
OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S (1969);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
175–88 (2007); GEORGE LEWIS, MASSIVE RESISTANCE: THE WHITE RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1–26 (2006); MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 21–38 (Clive Webb ed., 2005).
23. E.g., Associated Press, All Alabama Counties Complying with Gay Marriage Ruling,
LGBT Groups Report, AL.COM (July 2, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/
index.ssf/2015/07/all_alabama_counties_complying.html
[http://perma.cc/7SSS-GRG9].
Some counties in Alabama, however, are not issuing any marriage licenses, claiming state
law gives them discretion to issue no licenses—even though there is widespread
understanding that if judges issue licenses to opposite-sex couples, they must issue them to
same-sex couples as well. See Associated Press, Alabama Judges Must Issue Gay Marriage
Licenses if They Issue Straight Marriage Licenses, Court Rules, AL.COM (July 2, 2015),
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to condemn a state’s possible withdrawal from the marriage business,
especially if that withdrawal were preceded by a meaningful deliberative
process about the best way forward after the Court’s imposition of marriage
equality.
Ultimately, I am doubtful that this potential form of resistance to the
Obergefell decision would be on the wrong side of history. To go a bit
further, LGBT advocates fresh from their recent victory might do well to
join with those on the Right looking to get their states to recede from the
marriage business. Now that the stain of indignity and inequality has been
removed in this domain, it may be time to think more progressively about
the future of marriage.
What some marriage-skeptics within the LGBT community wanted to
achieve even before the gay rights movement double-downed on the quest
toward marriage equality was a true separation of church and state, in which
the government would only recognize secular unions, free of gender scripts
and the normativity of bourgeois domesticity.24 For this group of thinkers,
although marriage equality was a no-brainer if the state was going to have
marriage at all, there was real suspicion even of an ultimately integrated
version of the institution. To “queer” family life, the plan requires more
than domesticating same-sex couples into the religious, gendered, and
bourgeois institution. Even if the inclusion of queer families into the
traditional institution would serve to mix things up helpfully, the left wing
of the LGBT community understood that it was plausible to hope for less
normativity from the state about how to order family life.25
Several different strategies could move us closer to that outcome: (1)
disestablishing all marriage and opting only for the “civil unions for all”
solution as a public law matter;26 (2) including a wider array of state
options for familial organization without privileging one over another, so
that couples could sign registries or contracts or unions or marriages and all
get the same default treatment, whatever they choose; or (3) even more
radically rethinking all family law to get the state to further recede from the
bedroom and the home. Because option (3) has the most potential to leave
vulnerable persons subject to predation in the private sphere, probably
implicates gender equality itself because it leaves the state impotent to
intervene when necessary, and is the hardest to envision how to implement,
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_judges_must_issue_gay.html
[http://perma.cc/6J46-AMMV]. More recently, Kentucky county clerk Kim Davis declined
to issue a marriage license despite the Court’s rejection of her request for a delay. See Alan
Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Defies Justices on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2015, at A1.
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
25. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 7–9 (2000).
26. One might include in this option the various proposals for a singular “intimate
caregiver” status and a “friend registry” as well. See sources cited supra note 5. For more on
distributing the benefits and burdens of family status based on care-giving relationships
rather than the traditional marital or biological family, see DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M.
COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF
FAMILY TIES (2009).
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options (1) and (2) seem more attractive and achievable in the medium
term. In an ironic turn, the states that see themselves as interested in
resisting marriage equality are at least opening a pathway toward option
(1)—and it may be valuable for the marriage-skeptics in the LGBT
community and elsewhere to work with legislators in Alabama and
Oklahoma to bring them closer to their goals, whether by refining option (1)
or helping those legislatures understand option (2). Marriage-skeptics
didn’t quite foresee that it might just take the marriage equality win to start
working with the other side to disestablish marriage.
*

*

*

It is worth taking a slightly closer look at what Alabama and Oklahoma
proposed before Obergefell to help identify just how these plans could be
tweaked to make both the religious objectors to same-sex marriage and the
left wing LGBT community work together for a mutually advantageous
outcome.
Alabama’s proposal is the somewhat more progressive approach. Four
Republicans and one Democrat sponsored the bill; three other Democrats
ultimately voted in its favor.27 Although Senate Bill 377 did not actually
purport to get rid of the status of marriage, it did secularize it by
prospectively recognizing only “contracts of marriage”28 that could be
entered into by any two persons “who are otherwise legally authorized to be
After Obergefell, that would have included same-sex
married.”29
contractors in Alabama. Ultimately, very little about Alabama’s family law
was going to change: there were going to be couples “recorded” as
“married” in Alabama’s law. But Alabama was going to make small
changes, none of which were obviously retrogressive; they might even be
thought to be on a progressive path.
Most importantly, Alabama was no longer going to be in the business of
issuing marriage licenses, preferring instead for couples simply to present a
contract signed by witnesses to a probate court to be considered married
under law. The contract was going to serve as the record of the marriage,
and the state requirement of a license to marry was going to be abolished.
Although largely a change in nomenclature rather than a thorough and
substantive revisiting of the state’s entanglement in marriage, even as an
expressive shift in emphasis, there is much to recommend the approach. By
distancing the state from endorsing the sacredness of the marriage bond and
emphasizing its civil nature, Alabama was planning to open the door to a
27. S.B. 377, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015), https://legiscan.com/AL/rollcall/SB377/
id/447983 [http://perma.cc/H8B3-AW9B].
28. Alabama’s formulation is neither really contractualist nor fully status-oriented. For
that reason, it is both creative and hard to know what to make of it. For some criticism of
moving more in the contractualist direction, see Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage: On
the Public Importance of Private Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE 3, 5–6 (Joshua Cohen &
Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
29. Ala. S.B. 377 § 1(a).
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version of the institution that may have been closer to France’s treatment of
marriage at the state level, which keeps the name “marriage” but in a
wholly secularized form.30
This might not go far enough for some progressives who would prefer a
greater disestablishment, of course.31 But to the extent that the state was
merely looking to withdraw from sanctifying marriages itself, allowing
parties to contract in a civil process for state recognition, the proposed
Alabama regime was at least a step toward disentanglement without any
explicit power delegated to the private religious sphere. Implicitly, the new
regime would permit religious institutions to exclude same-sex couples
from their version of marriage. But the civil marriage category would be
open to all couples wishing to sign a civil contract.
Yet even for those who wish for greater disestablishment nationwide,
Alabama’s proposed approach might be better than a full withdrawal from
marriage altogether. To wit, if Alabama “withdrew from the marrying
business, leaving the expressive domain to religions and to other private
groups, and offering [only] civil unions to both same- and opposite-sex
couples,”32 it would leave all Alabama couples in a purgatory from the
standpoint of federal law, which relies on “marriage” as the relevant status
for the conferral of federal benefits. So from the standpoint of continuity
and coherence with the federal regime, Alabama’s approach is a decent
interim position in a direction that provides advantages for both religious
and progressive communities that want the state to be in a different
relationship with marriage.
Perhaps progressives could even convince Alabama’s legislative houses
to provide for both contracts of marriage and contracts of civil unions or
domestic partnership (available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples),
deeming both contracts to have identical benefits and burdens statewide.
Whether the state could deem a civil union within the state to get the
marital package at the federal level is trickier—and it may take federal
legislative action to accomplish that objective of putting a wider menu of
relational arrangements on equal footing. But at the least giving couples
more choices about what to call their coupling to the state—whether samesex or opposite-sex—is something that should be acceptable to both

30. See Andrew C. Stevens, By the Power Vested in Me? Licensing Religious Officials
to Solemnize Marriage in the Age of Same-Sex Marriage, 63 EMORY L.J. 979, 1016 (2014)
(“For example, France requires a ceremony celebrated by a civil authority; a religious
ceremony may or may not be held afterwards.” (citing Code Civil [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art.
165 (Fr.))).
31. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 721, 725 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 2d ed. 1997);
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Tamara Metz, The Liberal Case for
Disestablishing Marriage, 6 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 196, 199 (2007); Alice Ristroph &
Melissa Murray, Feature, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010); Edward
A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2006).
32. Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 672.
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camps.33 Such an approach could also provide the benefit of not effectively
compelling people to get married;34 after marriage equality, many
companies and insurers are shedding benefits for “significant others” when
that other is not a spouse, and that is shoving private ordering into a
compulsory marriage regime.35 This is a troubling development just at the
time the state may be able to distance itself from moralistic marriage.
Oklahoma’s efforts were more troubling than Alabama’s. On the surface,
Oklahoma’s House Bill 112536 also proposed to do away with marriage
licenses issued by the state—without quite disbanding the status of
marriage. The state was proposing to “record” marriages without
sanctifying or solemnizing them itself. But its regime did not go as far
toward secularizing marriage as Alabama’s Senate proposed. Although the
bill referred to marriages being “contracted” in disparate provisions, the
Oklahoma bill is substantially less contractarian than Alabama’s.
To be sure, the Oklahoma House proposed to strike from its family law—
before Obergefell—the rules limiting marriage to “person[s] of the opposite
sex.”37 But in the list of people that may perform or solemnize marriages,
33. When the Dutch government decided to offer “registered partnerships” along with
marriage to both opposite- and same-sex couples, many opposite-sex couples wanted the
marriage-like institution “devoid of the symbolism attached to marriage.” Kees Waaldijk,
Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 457–58 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001)
(ebook). As most states in the United States that have created “civil unions” or “domestic
partnerships” before marriage equality offered the option mostly to same-sex couples (and
only to opposite-sex couples rarely or on a restricted basis), see generally Case, supra note 6,
at 1774–76, it has not been easy to tell what the demand for such an option might be more
generally.
34. Consider Katherine Franke’s video reflection on Obergefell. See Catrin Einhorn,
How We Changed Our Thinking on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/26/us/changed-thinking-on-gay-marriage.html
(explaining that all the gay couples in Franke’s social circle who were once critical of
marriage are now marrying because their lawyers and accountants are telling them they are
crazy not to) [http://perma.cc/7UCF-UYDG]. Although Janet Halley already in 2006
highlighted the way we are all compelled to “[c]arry[] a [b]rief for” marriage, JANET
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17 (2006),
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell is a very clear version of that brief, now
announced as the supreme law of the United States.
35. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Fate of Domestic Partner Benefits in Question After
Marriage Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/yourmoney/fate-of-domestic-partner-benefits-in-question-after-marriage-ruling.html
[http://perma.cc/X3SL-PZLR]; Laura Lorenzetti, Looking to Stay on Your Partner’s
Insurance? It May Be Time to Get Married, TIME (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3938225/
same-sex-benefits-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/9UMA-XHWW].
36. H.R. 1125, 2015, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015), https://legiscan.com/OK/text/HB1125/
2015 [http://perma.cc/DAX3-3G3K].
37. The red-lined proposed changes to Oklahoma’s family law are available online. See
id. Same-sex marriage has been available in Oklahoma since 2014, Bishop v. Smith, 760
F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), so the small change here in state legislation was already
effectively required by the federal courts. But it was still a recognition that state laws on the
books should change through legislation, not just through decrees of federal courts. James
Brudney and I are starting to develop an account of when it makes sense for legislatures to
undertake “legislative underwrites” when they want to adopt, through the democratic
process, ends that have already been won through the judicial process.
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Oklahoma purported to include not only “at least two adult, competent
persons as witnesses” and “a judge or retired judge of any court” in
Oklahoma, but also “an ordained or authorized preacher or minister of the
Gospel, priest or other ecclesiastical dignitary of any denomination who has
been duly ordained or authorized by the church to which he or she belongs
to preach the Gospel, or a rabbi.”38 In a way, this privatizes marriage,
enabling parties to get married by friends, a judicial official, or a religious
institution. But the approach does not cleanly secularize marriage, and puts
religious (exclusionary) marriage on the same footing as judicial (equal
access) marriages: they all get recorded as legitimate marriages by the
state. Unlike Germany and France, where the state is clear that civil
marriage is the only legally relevant category (and religious marriages have
no public legal validity),39 Oklahoma’s regime elevates the religious
marriage and records it as legitimate within the state on par with a marriage
before a judge. More, Oklahoma’s proposed regime would continue to
require a ceremony, reinforcing the bourgeois nature of the institution.40
In short, although Oklahoma’s modest effort to privatize marriage by
ceasing to issue “licenses” was a “baby step” toward disestablishment (if it
can even be called that), there is little in the rough draft of the bill as it
stands to garner much support from the marriage-skeptics in the LGBT
community. Oklahoma’s approach would tend to reinforce the religious
and bourgeois character of the institution. Yet it may be possible to
convince the State House and/or Senate in the future to craft a better regime
that protects both the freedom of religion and the freedom from marriage,
especially a too-religious and bourgeois version of it. Some evidence that
these issues are not purely partisan and that common ground might be
found can be gleaned by studying the roll call votes in Oklahoma on House
Bill 1125: Republicans and Democrats do not seem to have settled on a
clear position about the way forward in this area.41 Deliberation may
continue and actually produce progress for all.
*

*

*

Marriage-skeptics largely failed to predict that a successful marriage
equality movement, culminating in a favorable decision from the Supreme
Court, could get them somewhat closer to their goals by hitching a ride with
some of the resistors to integrating the institution of marriage. Even Justice
Kennedy’s over-the-top preaching about the virtues of marriage comes shy
of actually compelling states to offer marriage from a constitutional
38. Okla. H.R. 1125 § 7(A).
39. See Case, supra note 6, at 1793–94 (citing FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 297 (Carolyn
Hammond & Alison Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002)); Stevens, supra note 30, at 1016 (citing Code
Civil [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 165 (Fr.)).
40. The Oklahoma bill had an exception for common law marriages, which would be
valid without a ceremony—as long as the parties were otherwise eligible to be married and
signed a notarized affidavit. See Okla. H.R. 1125 § 5(E).
41. See Okla. H.R. 1125.
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perspective. But from a social perspective, marriage equality’s success
might make marriage seem almost compulsory for couples—and the LGBT
marriage-skeptics were probably right that this can serve to denigrate
people who do not couple in the one way the state recognizes in the United
States. Ultimately, those marriage-skeptics may have to hold their noses
when they see who it is that can help them disestablish marriage from the
state. But in the marriage debate as elsewhere, politics makes strange
bedfellows. There is work to be done, and the Right and the Left might be
able to coordinate and collaborate on the future of marriage, now that there
is no question about the equal public rights of same-sex couples to marriage
if the state offers it.

